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Recent developments in relational frame theory (RFT) have outlined a number of key 
variables of potential importance when analyzing the dynamics involved in derived relational 
responding. Recent research has begun to explore the impact of a number of these variables 
on persistent rule-following, namely, levels of derivation and coherence. However, no 
research to date has systematically examined the impact of coherence on persistent rule-
following at varying levels of derivation. Across two experiments, the impact of coherence 
(manipulated through the systematic use of performance feedback) was explored on persistent 
rule-following when derivation was relatively low (Exp. 1) and high (Exp. 2). A training 
protocol based on the implicit relational assessment procedure (IRAP) was used to establish 
novel combinatorially entailed relations that manipulated the feedback provided on the 
untrained, derived relations (A-C) for five blocks of trials in Experiment 1 and one block of 
trials in Experiment 2. One of these relations was then inserted into the rule for responding on 
a subsequent contingency-switching match-to-sample task to assess rule persistence. While no 
significant differences were found in Experiment 1, the provision or non-provision of 
feedback had a significant differential impact on rule persistence in Experiment 2. These 
differences, and the subtle complexities that appear to be involved in persistent rule-following 









Within behavior analysis, two concepts that have been widely acknowledged as important in 
the study of human language and cognition are rule-governed behavior and derived stimulus 
relations. The former, rule-governed behavior, was first proposed by B.F. Skinner (1966) in 
the context of an operant account of human problem solving. Specifically, it was argued that 
rules specified reinforcement contingencies that had the potential to override the impact of 
direct contact with environmental contingencies. In this way, the listener could problem solve 
without having to directly contact reinforcement contingencies. For example, the simple rule 
“don’t take sweets off strangers” given to a child by a parent allows the child to learn 
important safety skills without having to potentially experience the negative consequences of 
engaging in such behavior. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a great deal of research sought to investigate the 
ways in which rules impacted human reinforcement schedule performance (see Hayes, 1989, 
for an early book-length treatment). An interesting and key phenomenon that emerged from 
this research was that rule-governed behavior in verbally-able humans often led to 
performances that did not adapt readily to task contingencies, but remained consistent with a 
rule or rules provided by an experimenter (e.g., Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway, 1986; 
Shimoff, Catania, & Matthews, 1981). In very recent work, for example, participants were 
instructed to choose a comparison stimulus that differed most from a sample on a match-to-
sample (MTS) task, and points were awarded for following this rule (Harte, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & McEnteggart, 2017). In general, all participants responded in accordance 
with the rule and the contingencies. However, when the contingencies changed, and points 
were awarded for choosing the stimulus that differed least from the sample, participants 
sometimes continued to follow the rule even though doing so now led to a loss of points. This 
tendency for humans to follow rules in the face of competing reinforcement contingencies has 
sometimes been referred to as rule-based ‘insensitivity’ or persistent rule-following. 
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Furthermore, excessive persistent rule-following has sometimes been highlighted as an 
important feature of human psychopathology (hereafter referred to as human psychological 
suffering; e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Zettle & Hayes, 1982). The basic idea is that 
when humans persistently follow verbal rules rather than adapting to natural contingencies, 
this by definition undermines contextual sensitivity, which is associated with psychological 
suffering. 
As noted above, the second concept widely acknowledged as important in the study of 
human language in behavior analysis is that of derived stimulus relations. The concept first 
emerged with the work of Sidman (1971), the basic phenomenon of which came to be referred 
to as stimulus equivalence. The main finding was that reinforcing a number of matching 
responses in human participants often readily produced a number of unreinforced matching 
responses. For example, if stimulus relations X-Y and X-Z were trained, derived Y-Z and Z-Y 
relations were also observed. When such a pattern of emergent and untrained responding 
occurred, the stimuli involved were said to form an equivalence class or relation. 
Furthermore, other unreinforced responses also emerged when a specific function was trained 
to a stimulus participating in this newly derived relation (e.g., if X, Y, and Z participate in an 
equivalence relation, and X is paired with a reinforcer, Z may then acquire reinforcing 
functions in the absence of direct pairing). Crucially, this phenomenon appeared to occur with 
relative ease in verbally-able humans, but was not readily or reliably observed in humans with 
severely limited language abilities or in nonhumans (see Sidman, 1994, for a book-length 
treatment). Indeed, the lack of evidence for even the most basic equivalence responding in 
nonhumans has persisted (see Dougher, Twohig, & Madden, 2014). 
The extension of stimulus equivalence as an important explanatory tool for analyzing 
the complexities of human learning came with the development of relational frame theory 
(RFT), a behavior-analytic account of human language and cognition (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, 
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& Roche, 2001; Steele & Hayes, 1991). For RFT, stimulus equivalence is but one class of 
generalized operant behavior, of which many others are possible. Specifically, RFT suggests 
that there are many generalized relational operants or patterns of relational responding, 
referred to as relational frames including: similarity, difference, opposition, distinction, 
temporality, hierarchy, and deictic (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for an extensive 
review). The generic term or concept, arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR) is 
used to label these operant classes and their various and increasingly complex combinations 
or networks. 
While the experimental analyses of rule-governed behavior and derived stimulus 
relations have only rarely overlapped, a strong conceptual link has long existed between the 
two. Indeed, some researchers have suggested that complex derived relational responding, 
involving networks of derived relations, may provide the basis for rule-governed behavior 
itself. For example, consider the simple instruction, “When the kettle whistles then take it off 
the hob.” “Kettle”, “whistle”, “hob”, and “take it off” all participate in equivalence relations 
with an actual kettle and hob, whistling sound, and an action, while the words “when” and 
“then” function as cues for the temporal relations operating among these events (i.e., 
whistling sound before taking the kettle off the hob). While this suggestion has been 
successfully modeled in the laboratory (O’Hora et al., 2004; O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Stewart, 2014), empirical research linking these two areas in the context of persistent rule-
following remains limited.  
The first study that attempted to integrate these two areas explored the extent to which 
a rule that involved a novel derived relation would generate rule persistence on a contingency-
switching MTS task (Harte et al., 2017). Specifically, participants were given either a direct 
rule that specified exactly how to respond (i.e., choose the stimulus that is least like the 
sample), a rule that involved a derived relation (i.e., an equivalence relation was first 
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established between “least like” and the novel word “beda”, after which “beda” was inserted 
into the rule in the place of “least like”), or no rule. For the first 100 trials of the MTS task, 
points were awarded for choosing the least like comparison (i.e., following the rule) after 
which the contingencies reversed for a further 50 trials. While the direct rule produced most 
rule persistence, the rule that contained the derived relation produced more persistence than 
the no rule condition, thus providing the first evidence that rules that involved derived 
relations could override direct contingencies of reinforcement. 
The study reported by Harte, et al. (2017) emerged in parallel with a new conceptual 
framework for analyzing the dynamics involved in AARR generally, known as the hyper-
dimensional, multi-level (HDML) framework (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
McEnteggart, 2020). The framework focuses on five levels of relational development (i.e., 
mutual entailment; combinatorial entailment; relational networks; relating relations; relating 
relational networks) that intersect with four dimensions (i.e., coherence; complexity; 
derivation; flexibility). The details of the complete framework are beyond the scope of the 
present article, but specific features of the framework are relevant to research that followed on 
from the Harte, et al. work. For example, Harte, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, and 
McEnteggart (2018) explored the impact of derivation at different levels of relational 
development. Within the HDML framework, and indeed RFT generally, derivation refers, 
broadly speaking, to how often a particular derived relational response has been emitted in the 
past. The more a derived relational response is emitted, the less derived it becomes, because it 
acquires its own history that extends beyond the derivation that was made based on the 
‘baseline’ relation. For example, imagine that an individual learns that A is smaller than B, 
and thus derives that B is bigger than A. The first time that the B>A relation is derived, it is 
derived ‘directly’ from the A<B baseline relation. However, if the individual subsequently 
continues to respond to B as bigger than A, that relational response gradually acquires its own 
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history, irrespective of whether or not it is directly reinforced, rendering it less and less 
derived from the original baseline relation (i.e., A smaller than B). 
In the experiments reported by Harte et al. (2018), the opportunities to derive novel 
mutually entailed (i.e., Least like=Beda; Experiment 1) and combinatorially entailed (i.e., 
Least like=XXX=Beda; Experiment 2) relations were manipulated. That is, one group of 
participants had 120 opportunities (Low Derivation) to derive the critical relation, while the 
other group had only 8 opportunities (High Derivation). These relations were then inserted 
into the rule for responding on the same MTS task employed by Harte et al. (2017). Results 
showed that lower levels of derivation generally produced more persistence in rule-following 
than higher levels. 
Subsequent research focused on the dimension of coherence (Harte et al., 2020). 
Within the HDML framework, coherence refers to the extent to which a particular pattern of 
relational responding is consistent (coherent) with previously established patterns. For 
example, if you are told that ‘X is larger than Y,’ the derived response that ‘Y is smaller than 
X’ would be deemed highly coherent because the contextual cues (“larger than” and “smaller 
than”) participate in many other relational networks that have been reinforced, or at least not 
punished, by the wider verbal community (e.g., “trucks are generally larger than cars, so cars 
are generally smaller than trucks”). 
In the study conducted by Harte et al. (2020), coherence was manipulated through the 
presence versus absence of performance feedback. Combinatorially entailed relations were 
first established for all participants after which feedback was either provided or not provided 
on the trained relations (A=B and B=C; Experiment 1), and on the untrained, derived relations 
(A=C; Experiment 2). As with the previous studies in this line of research, one of these 
relations was then inserted into the rule for responding on the same contingency-switching 
MTS task to assess its impact on rule persistence. While no significant differences were found 
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in Experiment 1, the provision or non-provision of feedback differentially impacted upon rule 
persistence in Experiment 2. Specifically, participants in the Feedback group showed more 
persistent rule-following than the No Feedback group, following the contingency reversal.  
The primary purpose of the current study was to replicate and extend the research 
reported by Harte et al. (2020). Specifically, the current research attempted to manipulate both 
coherence and derivation in an effort to explore the dynamics among these two dimensions. 
The reader should note that a fundamental assumption of the HDML framework is that the 
dimensions themselves are inherently dynamical, and thus, research based on the framework 
will necessarily involve exploring these dynamics.1  
 Experiment 1 involved training participants on novel A-B and B-C relations followed 
by directly testing the novel A-C relations with and without feedback for five blocks (i.e., 160 
trials). Experiment 2 partially replicated Experiment 1, but tested the novel A-C relations with 
and without feedback for only one block (i.e., 32 trials). Within Experiments 1 and 2, 
coherence was manipulated through the provision versus non-provision of performance 
feedback, while derivation was explored across experiments by manipulating opportunities to 
derive the A-C relation. A range of self-report measures of psychological distress were used 
to explore the extent to which derived rule-following may correlate with self-reported levels 
of distress. Two other self-report measures of rule-following were also employed to determine 
if they would predict actual persistent rule-following. Given the relatively inductive nature of 
the current research, we refrained from making formal predictions. 
 
 
1 An inherent assumption of the HDML framework is that changes in one dimension may involve changes in 
other dimensions. Thus, it is possible, for example, that as derivation reduces coherence may increase. 
Recognizing the dynamical nature of the dimension of AARRing does not mean, however, that experimental 
analyses cannot attempt to examine the differential impact of one dimension relative to another. It is entirely 
reasonable, therefore, to test the impact of coherence by manipulating feedback while recognizing that derivation 
per se is also likely influencing coherence. Ultimately, the utility of the units of analysis specified within the 
HDML framework will remain an empirical matter. For example, if derivation and coherence cannot be analyzed 
as separate dimensions, then no differences should be observed between conditions that attempt to separate these 





A total of 67 individuals participated in Experiment 1, 44 females and 23 males. They 
ranged in age from 18 to 47 years (M = 21.63, SD = 5.49) and were recruited through random 
convenience sampling from the online participant system at X University. Thirty-three 
participants were paid a fixed sum of 10 euros for participation, while 34 received course 
credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions referred to as: Feedback 
and No Feedback. Paid and course-credit participants were distributed in a roughly equal 
manner between the two feedback conditions (17 paid and 18 course-credit in Feedback; 17 
paid and 15 course-credit in No Feedback). The data from 7 participants (5 from Feedback [2 
paid and 3 course-credit] and 2 from No Feedback [2 paid]) were excluded because they 
failed to meet specific performance criteria on either a Training IRAP or the MTS task (see 
below), leaving N = 60 for analysis, 30 in each condition. In general, 30 participants per 
condition yielded statistically significant effects (or approaching significance) in previously 
published studies that employed the type of procedures utilized here, and thus we decided to 
run 30 as a minimum.    
Setting 
 The experiment was conducted in a cubicle at X University in which participants were 
seated in front of a standard Dell laptop. The experimenter was present at the beginning of 
each task to instruct participants, and also while participants completed Stages 1-3 of the 
Training IRAPs (see below). Participants were alone at all other stages of the experiment.  
Materials and Apparatus 
The experiment involved three computer-based tasks (a Derivation Pre-training task, 
the Training IRAP, and an MTS task) and six self-report measures.  
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The Derivation Pre-training Task. The purpose of the Derivation Pre-training Task 
(identical to that employed by Harte et al., 2020) was to provide participants with a history 
within the experiment of relating stimuli that were deemed to be semantically similar or 
dissimilar. The task involved six sets of stimuli, with three stimuli in each set (see Table 1). 
During the task, the stimuli were presented in pairs in such a way that for some pairs 
participants should already know the relation between them because they were English and 
Dutch words (e.g., “hond” and “dog”). For other pairs, the relation between them should be 
unknown because the pairs contained an Irish word (e.g., “madra” or “dubh”) or a nonsense 
stimulus (e.g., XXX or ////). The remaining pairs contained words that allowed participants to 
derive a relation between a known Dutch word and a previously unknown Irish word. The 
general purpose of this pre-training task was to prepare participants for deriving the target 
relations with completely novel stimuli in the context of persistent rule-following in 
subsequent stages of the experiment (pilot work had indicated high levels of attrition without 
this type of pre-training). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The Derivation Pre-training Task was presented in Microsoft PowerPoint. All trials 
presented a label stimulus at the top of the screen (e.g., “Hond”, the Dutch word for “Dog”), a 
target stimulus in the middle (the English word “Dog”), and two response options, for 
example, the Dutch words “Goed” (meaning correct) and “Verkeerd” (meaning incorrect), 
which appeared at the bottom left and right of the screen.  
The Training IRAPs. Consistent with Harte et al. (2018, 2020), three Training IRAPs 
were used to establish a relational network involving directly trained relations between known 
words (A stimuli) and symbols (B stimuli), and between the same symbols (B stimuli) and 
novel words (C stimuli). The IRAPs employed stimuli from Sets 7 and 8 (see Table 2). As 
such, during training of the A-B relations, Dutch words and phrases were presented (the 
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English translations are used here). All trials presented a label at the top of the screen, with a 
single target below, and two response options. The label stimuli always comprised one of two 
phrases “Least Similar” or “Most Similar”, the target stimulus was always “TTT” or “]][[”, 
and each pair of response options comprised “True” versus “False”, “Yes” versus “No”, 
“Correct” versus “Incorrect”, or “Right” versus “Wrong.” These stimuli were combined to 
generate four A-B trial-types referred to as: Least Similar-TTT; Most Similar-TTT; Least 
Similar-]][[; and Most Similar-]][[ (see Figure 1).  
INSERT TABLE 2 & FIGURE 1 HERE 
During training of the B-C relations, each trial presented the stimuli “TTT” or “]][[” as 
labels, the novel words “Beda” and “Sarua” as targets, along with the same response options. 
Taken together, the four B-C trial-types were as follows: TTT-Beda; ]][[-Beda; TTT-Sarua; 
and ]][[-Sarua (see Figure 2).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
The mixed A-B/B-C Training IRAP was similar to the A-B and B-C Training IRAPs, 
except that A-B and B-C relations were presented within each block of training trials, rather 
than across two separate IRAPs. This created eight trial-types, identical to the four A-B trial-
types and the four B-C trial-types listed above.  
The final Training IRAP presented the untrained A-C relations that could be derived 
from the mixed A-B and B-C Training IRAPs. Specifically, each trial presented the stimulus 
“Least Similar” or “Most Similar” as labels, with the novel words “Beda” and “Sarua” as 
targets, along with the same response options as before. Taken together, the four A-C trial-
types were as follows: Least Similar-Beda; Most Similar-Beda; Least Similar-Sarua; and 
Most Similar-Sarua (see Figure 3).  
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
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The MTS task. During each MTS trial, a sample stimulus (always a random shape) 
was presented at the top of the screen, with three comparison stimuli (all random shapes, but 
none identical to the sample nor to each other) along the bottom (see Figure 4 for an example 
of a single trial). Each comparison varied in its similarity to the sample. Specifically, one 
comparison was clearly the most similar to the sample (same basic shape with minor 
variations, see center of Figure 4). A second comparison was also quite like the sample, but 
with more variations (see left-hand side of Figure 4), rendering it less similar to the sample. 
Finally, the third comparison was clearly the least similar to the sample because it had little or 
no overlapping features (right-hand side of Figure 4). Each sample and three-comparison 
combination comprised an individual stimulus set, such that only those comparisons appeared 
in the presence of that sample. Participants emitted a response by pressing the key (D, G, or 
K) directly below the comparison they wished to select. A total of 54 stimulus sets were 
employed, with each set presented at least once, but no more than three times, across 150 
trials.  
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Questionnaires. Experiment 1 involved six self-report questionnaires, four of which 
were standardized measures (the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales, DASS-21; the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, AAQ-II; the Psychological Flexibility Index, PFI2; the 
Generalized Pliance Questionnaire, GPQ) and the Certainty Likert Scales and Propensity for 
Rule-Following Scale (PRFS). The first three scales were included as measures of 
psychological distress because such measures have been related to persistence in rule-
following in previous research (e.g., McAuliffe, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014). The 
Certainty Scales were employed as a self-report measure that could be seen as a potential 
 
2  The PFI employed in the current study was a very early version and to all intents and purposes no longer 
exists. The PFI is now named the Everyday Psychological Inflexibility Checklist (EPIC; Thompson, Bond, & 
Lloyd, 2019), which has only 7 items (in contrast to the 80 items in the PFI). We have not, therefore, presented 
any psychometric properties for the PFI. 
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additional measure of coherence that might be sensitive to the coherence manipulation (i.e., 
the provision versus non-provision of performance feedback). The GPQ and PRFS were 
included as self-report measures of persistent rule-following. 
The DASS-21 comprises three subscales measuring depression, anxiety, and stress 
across a total of 21 statements, with 7 statements per subscale (e.g., an item from the anxiety 
subscale was “I found it hard to wind down”; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). All items were 
rated in terms of participant experiences within the last week on a 4-point scale from 0 (Did 
not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very much or most of the time). An overall DASS 
score is calculated by summing all 21 items. All overall and subscale scores obtained are then 
doubled, and severity bands are generated accordingly. Specifically, the overall DASS score 
ranges from 0-126. Higher scores on the overall score and on each subscale indicate greater 
psychological distress. The measure has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (Henry 
& Crawford, 2005): depression (alpha = 0.88); anxiety (alpha = 0.82); stress (alpha = 0.90); 
and total DASS (alpha = 0.93). The Dutch version of the scale was employed in the current 
experiment, which according to deBeurs, Van Dyck, Marquenie, Lange, and Blonk (2001) has 
yielded similar sufficient internal consistency. Reliability analyses were conducted on the 
measures using the current sample (from Experiments 1 and 2) and yielded similar, albeit 
slightly lower, levels of internal consistency: depression (alpha = 0.86); anxiety (alpha = 
0.73); stress (alpha = 0.74); and total DASS (alpha = 0.90). 
The AAQ-II measures acceptance of negative private events across 7 statements (e.g., 
“My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilled life”; Bond et al., 2011). All items 
were rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (Never true) to 7 (Always true), yielding a minimum 
score of 7 and a maximum of 49. High scores indicate low acceptance, while low scores 
indicate high acceptance. The measure has demonstrated adequate internal consistency with 
alpha coefficients ranging from 0.78 to 0.88 (Bond et al.). Again, the Dutch version of the 
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scale was employed currently, which according to Bernaerts, De Groot, and Kleen (2012) has 
yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. Once again, reliability analyses were conducted on the 
measures using the current sample (from Experiments 1 and 2) and a yielded similar, albeit 
slightly higher, Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90. 
The PFI is designed to measure psychological flexibility (Bond et al., 2017), across a 
total of 80 statements (e.g., “Even when I am uncertain of what to do, I can still do what is 
right for me”). All items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 6 (Agree 
strongly) and the measure yields a total score (based on the summation of all items), with a 
minimum of 80 and a maximum of 480. High scores indicate high flexibility, while low 
scores indicate low flexibility. All items were translated into Dutch using the backward-
forward method.  
The Certainty Scales aimed to attain a self-report measure of participants’ certainty of 
the derived relations involved within the derived A-C network (i.e., the four trial-types 
involved in the A-C IRAP: Least Similar-Beda-True; Least Similar-Sarua-False; Most 
Similar-Beda-False; Most Similar-Sarua-True). The study thus involved four individual 7-
point scales, one for each trial-type. Participants were presented with a screenshot of each 
IRAP trial-type as it was presented within the IRAP (i.e., label at the top of the screen, target 
in the middle of the screen, and two response options at the bottom left- and right-hand sides 
of the screen) and were asked to rate from 1 (Extremely uncertain) to 7 (Extremely certain) 
how certain they were that the answer that they gave on this trial was correct. Along with 
generating certainty scores for each individual trial-type, a total certainty score was calculated 
by summing each individual trial-type score. This yielded a maximum certainty score of 28 
and a minimum of 4. 
The GPQ is designed to measure generalized pliance (Ruiz, Suárez-Falcón, Barbero-
Rubio, & Flórez, 2019) across a total of 18 statements (e.g., “My decisions are very much 
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influenced by other people’s opinions”). All items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (Never 
true) to 7 (Always true) and the measure yields a total score (based on the summation of all 
items), with a minimum of 18 and a maximum of 126. High scores indicate high pliance, 
while low scores indicate low pliance. Due to the fact there is no Dutch translation available, 
all items were again translated into Dutch using the backward-forward method. Reliability 
analyses were conducted using the current sample from both experiments and yielded an 
alpha coefficient of 0.93, comparable to the English version of the GPQ which has produced 
alpha coefficients of .93, .95, and .97 in undergraduate, general, and clinical populations, 
respectively (Ruiz et al.). 
The PRFS was created by Harte et al. (2018) to assess propensity to rule-following 
across 6 statements (i.e., “I would describe myself as someone who follows rules”; “If 
someone gives me a rule to follow, I do my best to follow that rule”; “I break rules often”; 
“When I break rules I feel uncomfortable”; “Rules are made to be broken”; and “If I was 
given a rule to follow and the rule proved to be incorrect, I would abandon the rule”). All 
items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (Always agree) to 5 (Always disagree), yielding a 
minimum score of 6 and a maximum of 30. Items 3, 5, and 6 were reverse scored. High scores 
indicate low propensity for rule-following, while low scores indicate high propensity for rule-
following. Reliability analyses were conducted across the samples of both experiments in the 
current study yielding a Cronbach’s alpha score of .65. 
Procedure 
 Experiment 1 comprised 5 stages (see Figure 5). Stage 1 presented the three initial 
questionnaires (i.e., DASS-21, AAQ-II, and PFI). Stage 2 presented the Derivation Pre-
training Task, which comprised three cycles, each made up of three phases: Phases 1 and 2 
always comprised four trials, while Phase 3 always comprised six trials. In Phases 1 and 2, the 
relation between the two stimuli was always one of similarity, whereas in Phase 3, the relation 
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was always one of difference. Stage 3 involved the Training IRAPs, which comprised four 
phases: Phase 1 presented the A-B relations Training IRAP; Phase 2 presented the B-C 
relations Training IRAP; Phase 3 presented the mixed A-B and B-C relations Training IRAP, 
in which A-B and B-C relations were mixed randomly within each block of trials. Phase 4 
presented a fixed number of five blocks of previously untrained A-C trials. Half of the 
participants continued to receive feedback on each trial, whereas the other half did not. Stage 
4 involved the MTS task, with rule-consistent contingencies in Phase 1 and rule-inconsistent 
contingencies in Phase 2. Finally, Stage 5 presented the remaining questionnaires (i.e., 
Certainty Scales, GQP, and PRFS). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Stage 1: DASS-21, AAQ-II, PFI, and DART. All participants completed the DASS-
21, the AAQ-II, the PFI, in that order and proceeded immediately to Stage 2.  
Stage 2: The Derivation Pre-training Task. The aim of the Derivation Pre-training 
Task was to minimize the attrition observed in previous studies using this paradigm (e.g., 
Harte et al., 2017, 2018), by providing participants with the opportunity to derive relations of 
sameness and difference between two stimuli based on a single ‘mediating’ third stimulus. A 
total of 42 trials were presented, and on each trial, the Experimenter read aloud the two on-
screen stimuli (e.g., “Hond” with “Dog” or “Hond” with “Black”) and asked participants to 
respond to the question “Do these two stimuli have the same meaning?” by stating, for 
example, “Yes” or “No”, which appeared on the bottom left- and right-hand sides of the 
screen.  
The experimenter recorded and provided corrective feedback on each response. Once 
a trial had finished, the next trial was then presented immediately. The Derivation Pre-training 
Task comprised three separate cycles of training (see Table 3). Each cycle contained the same 
three phases and the same training trials; only the stimulus sets differed across the three cycles 
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(see Table 1). Participants progressed immediately from one phase to the next and from one 
cycle to the next. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Phase 1: Co-ordination relations I. Phase 1 consisted of four trials involving stimulus 
Set 1. The first trial presented the stimuli “Hond” and “Dog” (feedback was provided after all 
trials); the second trial presented “Dog” and “Madra”; the third presented “Hond” and 
“Madra”; and the fourth presented the stimuli from the third trial but in the reversed order 
(“Madra” and “Hond”). Correct responding involved relating all of these stimuli as the same. 
Phase 2: Co-ordination relations II. Phase 2 consisted of the same four trials, but 
involving the stimuli from Set 2. Again, the first trial presented “Hemd” and “Shirt”; the 
second presented “Shirt” and “Leine”; the third presented “Hemd” and “Leine’; and the fourth 
presented the stimuli from the third trial but in the reversed order (“Leine” and “Hemd”). 
Correct responding involved relating all of these stimuli as the same. 
Phase 3: Distinction relations. Phase 3 consisted of six trials that combined the 
relations established above. The first trial presented “Hond” and “Black”; the second 
presented “Zwart” and “Dog”; the third presented “Dog” and “Dubh”; the fourth presented 
“Black” and “Madra”; the fifth presented “Hond” and “Dubh”; and the sixth presented 
“Zwart” and “Madra”. Correct responding involved relating all of these stimuli as different. 
 Cycles 2 and 3 were identical to Cycle 1, except that new stimulus sets were 
employed. Specifically, Cycle 2 employed Set 3 (“Hemd”, “Shirt”, “Leine”) and Set 4 
(“Fles”, “Bottle”, “Buideal”) and Cycle 3 employed Set 5 (“Boek”, XXX, “Leabhar”) and Set 
6 (“Jas”, ////, “Cota”). As noted above, Sets 5 and 6 contained both words and symbols. At the 
end of the third cycle, participants proceeded immediately to Stage 3. 
Stage 3: The Training IRAPs. Participants were initially instructed verbally on how 
to complete the Training IRAP. That is, they were advised that each trial would present a 
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phrase at the top of the screen with a symbol in the center, and that their task was to relate 
these together using one of the two response options as accurately as possible across each 
block (i.e., pressing D for the left option or K for the right option). This stage involved three 
Training IRAPs presented across four phases, and participants were required to reach the 
mastery criteria on each phase before proceeding to the next. 
Phase 1: A-B Relations Training IRAP. Phase 1 consisted of a block of 24 trials 
involving “Least Similar” and “TTT” from Set 7, and “Most Similar” and “]][[” from Set 8. 
There were four trial-types: Least Similar-TTT; Least Similar-]][[; Most Similar-]][[; and 
Most Similar-TTT. Correct responding was as follows: Least Similar-TTT/True; Most 
Similar-TTT/False; Least Similar-]][[/False; and Most Similar-]][[/True. There were six 
exposures to each trial-type, presented quasi-randomly within each block of 24 trials. Given 
that this was a Training IRAP, if a correct response was emitted the word “Right!” appeared 
immediately in the center of the screen, and the next trial appeared 400ms later. If an incorrect 
response was emitted, a red X appeared until a correct response was emitted. Participants 
received automated feedback on their overall accuracy and latency performances at the end of 
the first block of trials. If they had failed to achieve a mean accuracy (≥ 80%) and/or a mean 
latency (≤3000 ms) per trial-type during Phase 1, they were re-exposed to Phase 1 until these 
criteria were reached, at which point they could proceed to Phase 2. 
Phase 2: B-C Relations Training IRAP. Phase 2 consisted of a block of 24 trials 
involving “TTT” and “Beda”, and “]][[” and “Sarua”. The four trial-types were: TTT-Beda; 
TTT-Sarua; ]][[-Sarua; and ]][[-Beda. Correct responding was as follows: TTT-Beda/True; 
]][[-Beda/False; TTT-Sarua/False; and ]][[-Sarua/True. Again, there were six exposures to 
each trial-type and all other aspects of Phase 2 were identical to Phase 1.  
Phase 3: Mixed A-B and B-C Relations Training IRAP. Phase 3 consisted of a block 
of 32 trials involving all of the stimuli from Sets 7 and 8, presented in the same manner in 
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which they had been presented in Phases 1 and 2, all within the same block. Each of the four 
trial-types from Phase 1 and each of the four from Phase 2 were presented four times each, 
quasi-randomly. All other aspects of Phase 3 were identical to Phases 1 and 2. Participants 
could not proceed to Stage 4 until they had reached the mastery criteria on all three phases of 
Stage 3. It is important to emphasize that all participants received feedback on each trial 
throughout Phases 1-3 of the Training IRAP. 
Phase 4: 5 Blocks of Derived A-C Relations with or without Feedback. Phase 4 
presented participants with five blocks of previously untrained A-C relations. Half of the 
participants continued to receive feedback on every trial and at the end of each block, while 
the other half no longer received feedback at any point. At the beginning of this phase, 
participants in the No Feedback condition were explicitly instructed that they would no longer 
receive feedback at any point, but that it was still possible to get all trials correct. No 
performance criteria applied in Phase 4. Thus, all participants proceeded through each block 
and then immediately to Stage 4, once Phase 4 was complete. All participants were advised 
that during this stage some of the stimuli they had seen previously would be presented again, 
but in combinations that they had not seen before. Participants were also explicitly instructed 
not to worry about speed of responding (because the target relations were novel) but to focus 
on accuracy.  
Stage 4: MTS task. At the beginning of the MTS task, participants were instructed to 
“Respond by selecting the shape that is Beda to the sample stimulus.” It is important to recall 
that “Least Similar” had been trained as coordinate with “TTT”, and “TTT” was trained as 
coordinate with “Beda”. Hence, based on that training, it was now assumed that participants 
could correctly derive that “Least Similar” was coordinate with “Beda.” They were then 
instructed that each trial would present a shape at the top of the screen with three shapes on 
the bottom. Participants were advised that they would be awarded one point for each correct 
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response and deducted one point for each incorrect response, and that their total score would 
appear after each trial. All participants were explicitly instructed to try to accrue as many 
points as possible. The total MTS task comprised 150 trials, 100 trials presented in Phase 1 
and 50 trials presented in Phase 2.     
Phase 1: Rule-consistent contingencies. During the 100 trials that comprised Phase 1, 
all participants were required to select the comparison that was least similar to the sample. 
When a correct response was emitted, one point was awarded, and the screen cleared 
immediately to present the total number of points accrued thus far (in large red text in the 
center of the screen) for 3s. Emitting an incorrect response resulted in the loss of one point, 
again followed by a display of the total number of points. These feedback contingencies were 
thus consistent with the instruction to select the comparison that was least similar to the 
sample. 
Phase 2: Rule-inconsistent contingencies. At precisely the 101st trial, the task 
contingencies were reversed without warning. That is, the contingencies for correct and 
incorrect responding switched for the 50 trials that comprised Phase 2. Therefore, correct 
responding now involved selecting the comparison that was physically most similar to the 
sample, rather than least similar.  
Stage 5: Certainty Scales, GPQ, and PRFS. After the MTS task, participants 
completed the Certainty Scales, GPQ, and the PRFS in that order. 
Results and Discussion 
For the purposes of analysis, exclusion criteria were applied to the blocks involved in 
Phase 4 of the Training IRAPs. The data from 5 participants were removed because they 
failed to maintain ≥75% accuracy per trial-type in these blocks (4 in Feedback and 1 in No 
Feedback, N = 62 remaining). Consistent with Harte et al. (2020), no response latency 
criterion was applied to these blocks because the target relations were novel (i.e., they were 
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not preceded by direct training). A strict accuracy criterion was also applied to the MTS task 
and required correct responding on at least 8 of the first 10 trials, as well as 80 of the first 100 
trials in Phase 1. This MTS task criterion was consistent with Harte et al. (2017, 2018, 2020), 
and again was designed to reduce the likelihood that participants learned to respond correctly 
and match the stimuli on the basis of trial and error. The data from 2 participants were 
removed on this basis (1 in Feedback and 1 in No Feedback, N = 60 remaining).  
Certainty Scales and IRAP Data 
In order to assess whether participants’ self-reported certainty in the derived A-C 
relations differed between the Feedback and No-Feedback groups, the mean scores on each 
trial-type and on the overall score were compared. The means and standard deviations for 
each trial-type’s certainty score, and the mean overall certainty score for the Feedback and No 
Feedback conditions are presented in Table 4 (top). Independent t-tests confirmed that none of 
these scores between the Feedback and No Feedback groups differed significantly from each 
other (all ps > .38). 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The mean number of blocks required by participants in each condition in Stages 1-3 of 
the Training IRAPs were also compared. The mean number of blocks and their standard 
deviations for each stage for the Feedback and No Feedback conditions are presented in Table 
4 (bottom). Independent t-tests confirmed that none of these differences were significant (all 
ps ≥ .65, without correction for multiple tests). Thus, any subsequent differences that emerged 
among the groups during the Training IRAPs or the MTS task would not likely be due to 
differences in the ability to learn how to respond on the IRAP per se. 
Measures of Rule Persistence 
 The data from the 50 trials in Phase 2 of the MTS task presented after the contingency 
reversal were analysed in the same three ways as Harte et al. (2020): rule compliance, 
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contingency sensitivity, and rule resurgence. Rule compliance was defined as the total number 
of responses (out of 50) that were consistent with the initial instruction “Respond by selecting 
the shape that is Beda [Least Similar] the sample stimulus”, but were inconsistent with the 
reversed contingencies on the last 50 trials. Contingency sensitivity was defined as a pattern 
that comprised at least 3 consecutive responses that were not in accordance with the original 
instruction, and at least 1 of these must accord with the reversed contingency. Finally, rule 
resurgence was defined as the percentage of responses consistent with the initial rule that 
occurred after a participant had demonstrated contingency sensitivity (visual inspection of the 
data indicated that for the vast majority of participants, all three or more consecutive 
responses were in accordance with the reversed contingencies).  
Rule Compliance. Figure 6 presents the group means for rule compliance for both 
Feedback and No Feedback groups and shows a marginal difference between them. 
Specifically, the No Feedback group made a greater number of responses (M = 18.33, SD = 
17.45) in accordance with the original rule in the face of the reversed feedback contingencies 
than did the Feedback group (M = 14.93, SD = 13.15). An independent t-test revealed that this 
effect was not significant, t(58) = .852, p = .40. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
Contingency Sensitivity. Figure 7 presents the group means for contingency 
sensitivity, and once again shows a marginal difference between the Feedback and No 
Feedback conditions. That is, the No Feedback group emitted a greater number of responses 
(M = 17.07, SD = 16.16) in accordance with the original rule before demonstrating 
contingency sensitive responding than did the Feedback group (M = 14.73, SD = 12.56). An 
independent t-test revealed, however, that this difference was not significant, t (58) = .627, p 
= .53. 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
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Rule Resurgence. Figure 8 shows levels of rule resurgence among participants (i.e., 
there were no exclusions made on the basis of absence of contingency sensitivity). There is 
little visual evidence for differential levels of resurgence between these groups. For example, 
in the Feedback group, 6 participants resurged for over 10% of responses, compared with 4 in 
the No Feedback condition. Given that the data were severely skewed, a Mann Whitney U-
test was employed. Results confirmed that there was no significant difference between the 
groups (p = .70).  
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
Correlations 
Pearson’s correlational analyses were conducted between the rule compliance and 
contingency sensitivity measures of rule persistence and the self-report measures. For the rule 
resurgence measure, Spearman’s rank order correlational analyses were conducted. Given that 
neither condition differed significantly on any measure of rule persistence, correlational 
analyses were conducted with the data collapsed across Feedback and No Feedback groups. 
Out of a possible 26 correlations in the rule compliance and contingency sensitivity measures, 
only two reached significance. Both rule compliance (r = -.220, p = .04) and contingency 
sensitivity (r = -.281, p = .03) correlated negatively with the PFI, such that participants who 
reported lower levels of psychological flexibility were more likely to persist with rule-
following on the MTS task on both of these measures (all other ps > .19). Out of a possible 13 
correlations for the rule resurgence measure, no correlations reached significance (all ps > 
.23) 
Summary  
The results of this first experiment indicated that the presence versus absence of 
feedback did not differentially influence rule compliance, contingency sensitivity, or rule 
resurgence. In effect, attempting to increase relational coherence of the derived A-C relations 
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with the use of feedback appeared to have limited impact on persistent derived rule-following. 
The current finding could be seen, therefore, as a failure to replicate an effect reported by 
Harte, et al. (2020), in which higher levels of resurgence were found when feedback was 
provided for the derived A-C relations. On balance, the previous study presented only two 
blocks of A-C testing, whereas the current experiment presented five blocks. As such, it could 
be argued that the level of derivation was lower in the current experiment (because derivation 
reduces with additional testing), and perhaps as derivation reduces the impact of coherence, 
manipulated via feedback, has less influence. Or more informally, the more participants were 
allowed to practice a particular behavior, the more impervious to the feedback that behavior 
became. Indeed, it is exactly this type of interpretation of the results reported here that 
highlights the potentially highly dynamic nature of AARRing itself.  
Experiment 2 
At this point it was decided to run a second experiment, similar to Experiment 1, but in 
which level of derivation was relatively high. This was achieved by allowing participants to 
derive the A-C relations across only a single block of test trials. If the foregoing interpretation 
is correct, then the presence versus absence of feedback should impact upon persistent rule-
following as was reported in the Harte et al. (2020) study. The current experiment is not a 
direct replication, however, because participants were provided with only one block of A-C 
trials (rather than two). Thus, if the foregoing interpretation is correct, the impact of feedback 
should be readily observed because derivation will be even higher than was the case when 
feedback appeared to impact upon rule persistence. Experiment 2 also included the Dutch 
Adult Reading Test (DART; Schmand, Bakker, Saan, & Louman, 1991) in order to increase 
the length of time participants spent in the experiment, thus rendering it similar to Experiment 
1. Using the DART also allowed us to address concerns that any differences found in this and 
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preceding studies using similar preparations (e.g., Harte et al., 2018, 2020) could be due to 
variations in participant IQ (note, the DART has been used to predict IQ). 
Participants  
A total of 72 individuals participated in Experiment 2, 46 females and 26 males. They 
ranged in age from 18 to 42 years (M = 20.52, SD = 4.05) and were recruited through random 
convenience sampling from the online participant system at X University. Thirty-three 
participants were paid a fixed sum of 10 euros for participation, while 39 received course 
credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, again referred to as: 
Feedback and No Feedback. Once again, paid and course-credit participants were distributed 
in a roughly equal manner between the two feedback conditions (16 paid and 22 course-credit 
in Feedback; 17 paid and 17 course-credit in No Feedback). The data from 12 participants (8 
from Feedback [3 paid and 5 course-credit] and 4 from No Feedback [3 paid and 1 course-
credit]) were excluded because they failed to meet specific performance criteria on either a 
Training IRAP or the MTS task (see below), leaving N=60 for analysis, 30 in each condition.  
Setting 
 The setting was similar to Experiment 1, except that the Experimenter also now 
remained in the room to administer the DART. 
Materials and Apparatus 
The experiment involved the same three computer-based tasks and six self-report 
measures as Experiment 1. All participants were also required to complete the DART. 
Participants completed all aspects of the experiment on a standard Dell laptop. The DART 
(Schmand, et al., 1991) consists of 50 words that are considered irregular in terms of 
grapheme-phoneme correspondences. Participants are asked to read aloud and pronounce each 
word correctly, with accurate responding based on correct pronunciation. Participant total 
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errors are tallied, with higher errors suggesting lower IQ. The error score is then converted 
into a predicted WAIS Full Scale score, verbal IQ score, and performance IQ score. 
Procedure 
 Experiment 2 again comprised 5 stages. Stage 1 presented the three initial 
questionnaires and the DART (i.e., DASS-21, AAQ-II, PFI, and the DART). Stage 2 
presented the Derivation Pre-training Task, which comprised the same three cycles as 
Experiment 1. Stage 3 involved the Training IRAPs, which again comprised four phases, 
similar to Experiment 1: Phases 1-3 were identical to Experiment 1, while Phase 4 now 
presented participants with only one further block of previously untrained A-C trials after 
baseline relation training (i.e., one block instead of five). As in Experiment 1, half of the 
participants received programmed feedback for their responses, while the remaining half did 
not. Stage 4 involved the same MTS task, with rule-consistent contingencies in Phase 1 and 
rule-inconsistent contingencies in Phase 2, while Stage 5 again presented the remaining 
questionnaires (i.e., Certainty Scales, GQP, and PRFS). 
Results 
The same exclusion criteria that applied in Experiment 1 were applied here. With 
respect to Phase 4 of the Training IRAPs, data from 1 participant from the No Feedback 
condition were removed because they failed to maintain ≥75% accuracy per trial-type in these 
blocks (N=71 remaining). With respect to the MTS task, the data from 10 participants were 
removed (7 in Feedback and 3 in No Feedback; N=61 remaining) because they failed the 
inclusion criteria, as employed in Experiment 1. The data for one participant in the Feedback 
condition was also removed because they failed to meet the performance criteria on the A-B 
Training trials (N=60 remaining). 
DART, Certainty Scales, and IRAP Data 
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Prior to conducting the primary analyses, participants’ predicted full scale IQ, verbal 
IQ, and performance IQ (as measured by the DART) were compared (see top of Table 5). 
Independent t-tests confirmed that participants’ predicted IQ scores did not differ significantly 
between the two groups (all ps > .26). Thus, any subsequent differences that emerged among 
the groups during the Training IRAPs or the MTS task would not likely be due to differences 
in participant IQ. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
In order to assess whether participants’ self-reported certainty in the derived A-C 
relations differed between the Feedback and No-Feedback groups, the mean scores of each 
trial-type and the mean overall score were compared (see Table 5, centre). Independent t-tests 
confirmed that none of these certainty scores between the Feedback and No Feedback groups 
differed significantly from each other (all ps > .10). 
The mean number of blocks required in each condition in Stages 1-3 of the Training 
IRAPs were compared (see Table 5, bottom). Once again, independent t-tests confirmed that 
none of these differences were significant (all ps > .054).  
Measures of Rule Persistence  
 The data from the 50 trials in Phase 2 of the MTS task presented after the contingency 
reversal were analysed in the same three ways as in Experiment 1.  
Rule Compliance. Figure 9 presents the group means for rule compliance. 
Participants in the No Feedback group made a greater number of responses (M = 20.33, SD = 
18.38) in accordance with the original rule in the face of the reversed feedback contingencies 
than did those in the Feedback group (M = 13.03, SD = 11.82). An independent t-test 
revealed, however, that this effect did not reach significance, t(58) = -1.829, p = .07. 
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
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Contingency Sensitivity. Figure 10 presents the group means for contingency 
sensitivity. The No Feedback group made a greater number of responses (M = 20.33, SD = 
18.38) in accordance with the original rule before demonstrating contingency-sensitive 
responding than did the Feedback group (M = 10.07, SD = 4.09). An independent t-test 
confirmed that this difference was significant, t(58) = -2.99, p = .004.  
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE 
Rule Resurgence. Figure 11 presents differential levels of rule resurgence among all 
participants in both conditions (i.e., there were no exclusions made on the basis of absence of 
contingency-sensitivity). The data show some suggestion of greater resurgence in the 
Feedback condition than in the No Feedback condition. Given that the data were again 
severely skewed, a Mann Whitney U-test was employed, which revealed a significant 
difference between the conditions (Feedback, Md = 6.56%, No Feedback, Md = 5.00%, U = 
302.50, z  = -2.181, p = .03). 
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE 
Correlations 
Correlational analyses were conducted between the three measures of rule persistence 
and the self-report measures. Parametric analyses (Pearson’s r) were conducted for rule 
compliance and contingency sensitivity, while non-parametric analyses (Spearman’s rho) 
were conducted for rule resurgence.  
Given that the conditions did not differ significantly on the rule compliance measure, 
correlational analyses were conducted with the data collapsed across groups. Out of a possible 
13 correlations among the rule compliance measure of rule persistence and the self-report 
measures, only one reached significance. That is, rule compliance correlated with the Trial-
Type 2 Certainty Scale (r =.220, p = .04), such that participants who reported greater certainty 
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that Least Similar and Sarua did not have the same meaning were more likely to persist with 
rule-following on the MTS task (i.e., choosing the Beda/Least similar stimulus).  
Given the significant group differences recorded on the contingency sensitivity 
measure, separate correlational analyses were conducted for the Feedback and No Feedback 
groups and all self-report scales. Out of a possible 26 correlations, 2 proved to be significant. 
In the No Feedback group, contingency sensitivity correlated positively with the Trial-Type 2 
certainty score (r = .43, p = .01), suggesting that the more certain participants were that Least 
Similar did not have the same meaning as Sarua, the longer they would persist with the 
original rule (i.e., Beda has the same meaning as Least Similar). In the same condition (No 
Feedback), contingency sensitivity also correlated positively with participants’ overall 
certainty score (r = .40, p = .03), such that higher levels of certainty were associated with 
more persistent rule-following.  
Given the significant group differences recorded above for rule resurgence, separate 
correlational analyses were conducted for the Feedback and No Feedback groups and all self-
report scales. Only one correlation reached significance; in the No Feedback condition, 
greater resurgence was associated with higher compliance as measured by the GPQ (rho = 
.390, p = .03). 
Summary  
The findings from Experiment 2 suggested that manipulating the presence versus 
absence of feedback for the novel derived A-C target relations when derivation was high (i.e., 
only 1 block) influenced the three measures of rule persistence, significantly for contingency 
sensitivity and resurgence, with marginal significance for the rule compliance measure. 
Furthermore, the correlational analyses yielded a small number of significant effects, all of 
which were in the intuitively correct direction (e.g., increased rule persistence was associated 




The current study sought to extend recent research exploring the behavioral dynamics 
involved in persistent rule-following, focusing on two potentially key variables: levels of 
derivation and coherence. Coherence was manipulated through the provision or non-provision 
of feedback on novel, derived A-C relations while derivation was low (5 blocks of trials in 
Experiment 1) and subsequently while derivation was high (1 block in Experiment 2). The 
results indicated that the presence versus absence of feedback differentially impacted upon 
rule persistence when derivation was high, but not when it was low. Specifically, when 
derivation of the novel A-C relations was high in Experiment 2, the presence versus absence 
of feedback significantly impacted upon both the contingency sensitivity and rule resurgence 
measures. It should be noted, that a similar effect for rule resurgence was found when 
derivation was defined as relatively high (Harte et al., 2020). Unlike that previous study, 
however, an effect for contingency sensitivity was also found in Experiment 2 of the current 
study. On balance, participants in the current study received only one further block of A-C 
test trials whereas those in the previous study received two. In principle, therefore, derivation 
could be considered as even higher in the current study than in that of Harte et al., and 
perhaps this explains why contingency sensitivity also yielded a significant effect between the 
feedback and no feedback conditions. Certainly, future research could examine this 
suggestion more systematically. In any case, the current findings, along with those of the 
previous study, provide support for the suggestion that as derivation reduces, coherence (via 
feedback) has less influence on rule persistence; but when derivation is high, the impact of 
feedback seems to be far greater. In general, the results highlight the highly complex and 
dynamic nature of persistent rule-following, and indeed, of AARRing itself. 
An interesting pattern emerged in the results of Experiment 2 that should be noted. 
Specifically, the contingency sensitivity measure indicated that the No Feedback group 
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persisted for longer than the Feedback group. In simple terms, the former group persisted for 
longer in following the rule before checking to see if points were available for choosing the 
opposite (Most Like) stimulus. For the resurgence measure, however, the Feedback group 
returned to rule-following more readily than the No Feedback group. Thus, although the 
absence of feedback appeared to generate more persistence in terms of simply continuing with 
rule-following, the presence of feedback caused more participants to return to rule-following 
after they had contacted the reversed contingencies. This finding highlights the need to be 
relatively precise in defining exactly what we mean by the term “contingency sensitivity” or 
“rule-persistence” and the likely impact of contextual variables (such as the presence versus 
absence of feedback) on these different measures. It is also worth noting that the differential 
effect for feedback was only observed in Experiment 2, in which there was only one block of 
A-C testing (i.e., derivation was high), which further complicates the analyses. 
In a previous study using a similar preparation, the authors suggested that perhaps 
differences in intelligence between the groups could be a contributing factor to the level of 
rule persistence between groups (Harte, et al., 2018). Indeed, previous studies did not check or 
control for intelligence (except through random sampling). On balance, the lack of differences 
across conditions in the number of blocks taken by participants to complete the IRAP training 
suggested that intelligence was unlikely to have played a significant role (because 
performance on the IRAP has been shown to correlate with measures of intelligence; O’Toole 
& Barnes-Holmes, 2009). The same check for differences in IRAP training blocks was made 
in the current study, and Experiment 2 also included the DART -- a measure that has been 
shown to predict intelligence scores on the WAIS. The results showed no significant 
differences in the predicted intelligence scores (from the DART), and thus again it seems 
unlikely that intelligence played a significant role in determining differences in performance 
between Feedback and No Feedback conditions. Nonetheless, the DART is not a formal 
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measure of intelligence and thus we should be cautious in drawing strong conclusions 
concerning the absence of any role for levels of intelligence in explaining the current findings. 
Although the correlations between the three measures of rule persistence and the 
various self-report measures were very few in number, and should thus be interpreted with 
caution, those that did emerge may be worthy of further research. For example, a significant 
positive correlation emerged between the GPQ and the rule resurgence measure for No 
Feedback participants, a correlation that was found in the previous Harte et al. (2020) study. It 
appears, therefore, that when coherence for a derived rule is somewhat low (i.e., in the 
absence of feedback), self-reported compliance is more likely to predict rule persistence on 
the MTS task. In other words, coherence may moderate the relationship between the self-
reported tendency to engage in rule-following and actual rule-following itself. It is also 
interesting that in the No Feedback condition, higher scores on the certainty scales predicted 
higher contingency sensitivity scores (i.e., increased certainty correlated with greater rule 
persistence). Finally, significant correlations were also found in Experiment 1 between the 
rule compliance and contingency sensitivity measures and the PFI, indicating that  
limited psychological flexibility predicted greater persistence in rule-following.  
 In reflecting upon the potential implications of these correlational analyses, it is worth 
noting that the concept or definition of coherence was restricted to the derived relation that 
was contained within the rule (e.g., between Least Similar and Beda). However, the concept 
of coherence may also be applied to the relationship between the (derived) rule itself and the 
contingencies contacted during the MTS task. More informally, during initial exposure to the 
MTS task the rule fully cohered with the task, but following the contingency switch coherence 
between the rule and the task was completely undermined. At the present time it remains 
unclear if and how these two types of coherence/incoherence may have interacted but it could 
be an important area for future research to pursue. Consider, for example, that when 
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coherence for a derived rule was low (i.e., no feedback), self-reported compliance predicted 
rule persistence on the MTS task; this was not the case in the Feedback condition. Perhaps the 
presence of feedback for the derived relation reduced the functional overlap between this 
relational responding in the experiment and in the natural environment (in the ‘real world’ 
verbal relations are rarely reinforced in a continuous and highly programed basis). As a result, 
the ‘unnatural’ level of feedback undermined the extent to which subsequent performance on 
the MTS task could predict actual rule-following (as measured using a self-report measure). 
         Another finding worth noting is the fact that the certainty scales did not differentiate 
between the Feedback and No Feedback conditions, which might be deemed a counter-
intuitive result. Specifically, one might expect certainty to increase given programed 
feedback. Upon reflection, this counterintuitive finding could be due to the fact that the 
certainty scales were presented after participants had completed the contingency switching 
MTS task. In effect, all of the participants had experienced a spontaneous and ‘unexplained’ 
reversal in feedback contingencies before completing the scales, and perhaps this undermined 
the impact of the earlier feedback for the derived relations on the certainty measure. More 
informally, the contingency reversal in the MTS task undermined participants’ trust in the 
feedback as a reliable source of information. On balance, a small number of intuitively 
sensible correlations with the certainty scales emerged in Experiment 2. For example, as noted 
earlier, in the No Feedback condition higher levels of self-reported certainty (for the A-C 
relations) was associated with greater persistence in rule-following, in terms of the 
contingency sensitivity measure. In any case, it seems important that a future study would ask 
participants to complete the certainty scales before the MTS task, so that the potential impact 
of the spontaneous contingency reversal would be removed from the experimental sequence. 
At a more general level, it is also worth bearing in mind that the absence of an 
“expected” significant correlation(s) could be related to lack of power. Indeed, the current 
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findings may be useful in designing future studies because the relevant effects sizes reported 
here could be used as the basis for increasing the sample sizes. On balance, even if a higher 
number of correlations were detected with larger samples, it would still be important to 
explain any differences in the strength of the significant correlations that were obtained in 
terms of the variables (e.g., coherence, derivation, etc.) that we have identified here. In other 
words, if significant correlations between rule-persistence and measures of psychological 
suffering were obtained with larger samples, but the relative strength of these correlations 
were modified by the types of variables identified in the HDML, this would call for a more 
sophisticated theoretical analysis of the link between excessive rule-following and 
psychological suffering (see Harte, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Kissi, 2020, for a 
more extensive discussion). 
Overall, the current study, and the previously published studies in this line of research, 
have indicated quite clearly that the study of rule persistence in the face of conflicting 
contingencies requires a relatively sophisticated analytic approach. The highly dynamic nature 
of the interaction among variables, such as the impact of levels of coherence and derivation 
on flexibility in rule-following, needs to be factored into any analysis of excessive rule-
following generally, and particularly into any interpretive analysis of this behavior as a 
marker, or partial explanation for, human psychological distress (Zettle & Hayes, 1982; see 
also Kissi, Harte, Hughes, De Houwer, & Crombez, 2020, for a recent systematic review). 
Although the type of findings presented here, and in the previously published studies, 
somewhat complicate the narrative in this area, they also may help us to better understand the 
nature of the relationship. Indeed, this general approach could certainly be seen as more 
consistent with recent calls for a process-based approach to understanding and treating human 
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Stimulus sets employed within each cycle of the Derivation Pre-training Task. 
Derivation Pre-training Task Stimuli 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6 
Hond Zwart Hemd Fles Boek Jas 
Dog Black Shirt Bottle XXX //// 









































Training IRAPs Stimuli 
Set 7 Set 8 






Stimulus combinations employed within each block of trials in each cycle of the Derivation 
Pre-training task. Each cell represents an individual trial. 
 
 Cycle 1 
Relation Type Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 Set 1 Set 2 Sets 1 + 2 
Known Relations Hond = Dog Zwart = Black Hond ≠ Black 
   Zwart ≠ Dog 
Trained Relations  Dog = Madra Black = Dubh Dog ≠ Dubh 
   Black ≠ Madra 
Derived Relations  Hond = Madra Zwart = Dubh Hond ≠ Dubh 
 Madra = Hond  Dubh = Zwart Zwart ≠ Madra 
 Cycle 2 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 Set 3 Set 4 Sets 3 + 4 
Known Relations Hemd = Shirt Fles = Bottle Hemd ≠ Bottle 
   Fles ≠ Shirt  
Trained Relations  Shirt = Leine Bottle = Buideal Shirt ≠ Buideal 
   Bottle ≠ Leine 
Derived Relations  Hemd = Leine Fles = Buideal Hemd ≠ Buideal 
 Leine = Hemd Buideal = Fles Fles ≠ Leine 
 Cycle 3 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 Set 5 Set 6 Set  5 + 6 
Trained Relations Boek = XXX Jas = //// Boek ≠ //// 
   Jas ≠ XXX 
Trained Relations  XXX = Leabhar //// = Cota XXX ≠ Cota 
   //// ≠ Leabhar 
Derived Relations  Boek = Leabhar Jas = Cota Boek ≠ Cota 






















Group means and standard deviations for participant certainty scores per trial-type on the 
certainty scales and overall certainty score (top), and for the mean number of blocks taken per 
phase of the Training IRAP (bottom) in Experiment 1. 
 
Certainty Scale Feedback condition No Feedback Condition 
M SD M SD 
Trial-Type 1 6.68 .59 6.60 .72 
Trial-Type 2 6.19 1.62 6.27 1.26 
Trial-Type 3 6.29 1.22 6.13 1.14 
Trial-Type 4 6.74 .51 6.60 .77 
Overall Certainty Score 25.90 2.84 25.60 3.04 
Training IRAP  Feedback condition No Feedback Condition 
M SD M SD 
A-B relations 2.07 1.03 2.20 1.27 
B-C relations 1.77 .72 1.70 .88 
Mixed A-B/B-C 
relations 
1.39 .67 1.43 .57 
Total number of 
training blocks 





Group means and standard deviations for 1. Participant predicted IQ scores as measured by 
the DART 2. participant certainty scores per trial-type on the certainty scales and overall 
certainty score (centre), and for 3. the mean number of blocks taken per phase of the Training 
IRAP (bottom) in Experiment 2. 
 
DART Feedback Condition No Feedback Condition 
M SD M SD 
Predicted Full Scale IQ 121.90 3.06 120.60 5.22 
Predicted Verbal IQ 119.30 2.95 118.20 4.90 
Predicted Performance IQ 120.00 2.67 118.80 4.90 
Certainty Scale Feedback Condition No Feedback Condition 
M SD M SD 
Trial-Type 1 6.33 .80 6.03 1.45 
Trial-Type 2 6.10 .93 5.55 2.06 
Trial-Type 3 6.23 .77 5.66 1.76 
Trial-Type 4 6.13 1.33 6.10 1.35 
Overall Certainty Score 24.80 3.13 23.34 5.78 
Training IRAP Feedback Condition No Feedback Condition 
M SD M SD 
A-B relations 2.37 1.25 1.83 .81 
B-C relations 1.60 .68 1.62 .68 
Mixed A-B/B-C relations 1.43 .68 1.59 .87 




Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of the IRAP trial-types that appear in the A-B baseline 
relation training blocks. The four IRAP trial-types were denoted as follows: Least 
Similar-TTT; Most Similar-TTT; Least Similar-]][[; and Most Similar-]][[. 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of the IRAP trial-types that appear in the B-C baseline 
relation training blocks. The four IRAP trial-types were denoted as follows: TTT-









Figure 3. Diagrammatic representation of the four IRAP trial-types that appear in the derived 
A-C relation test blocks. The four IRAP trial-types were denoted as follows: Least 













































































A-C relations with No 
Feedback                          
(5 blocks) 
Phase 1              
A-B relations 
Phase 2              
B-C relations 

















Phase 1 * 
Phase 4       
Mixed A-B/B-C 
relations 
Figure 5. An illustration of the experimental sequence of Experiment 1. The procedure was similar for Experiment 2, except that the DART 
was included in Stage 1, and the A-C relation blocks in Stage 3 comprised one block instead of five. * See Table 2 for a detailed 
description of the stimulus set sequencing involved in each phase per cycle in Stage 2.  
A-C relations with 







Figure 6. Mean rule compliance scores with standard error bars for Feedback and No 





Figure 7. Mean contingency sensitivity scores with standard error bars for Feedback and No 


















































































































Figure 8. Box plots with a violin element illustrating the distribution and density of participant 








Figure 9. Box plots with a violin element illustrating the distribution and density of participant 














































Figure 10. Box plots with a violin element illustrating the distribution and density of participant 





Figure 11. Box plots with a violin element illustrating the distribution and density of participant 
rule resurgence scores for the Feedback and No Feedback conditions in Experiment 2. 
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